121 114 *613 [178] [186] [571] sedentary, but the semi-autonomous nature of the lineage segments is maintained to a large extent. The result of this is a de-emphasis of the "we-feeling" among the population of al-Qasr and an absence of "sense of community" (Easton 1965:332). By "community," I refer to a pattern of relatively intensive, face-to-face social relationships, and the values of solidarity and common goals to which these give rise. The relationship between lineage structure and territoriality was such that kinship segments within the same lineage unit might go days, and even weeks, with no inter-communication, and the degree of communication between separate lineage units of the tribe was less intensive than this. Such a communication pattern made observation difficult. The fact that Bedouin tribal society relatively lacks the group ceremonial aspect compounded the difficulty of gaining an overall perspective of structural relations, and of witnessing the bases and nature of social interaction outside the lineage structure. All of this emerges from a communication structure and kinship structure differentiated into corporate groups which "discourage close participation of members in the social relations of the larger society" (Wolf 1957:7).

121 [123] The structural arrangement of al-Qasr was such that, in plain language, not a great deal was happening in the sociological sense. I say this about al-Qasr in comparison with, for instance, a full-blown village community. Consequently, I observed from day to day that which I could,

175 According to Murray, on July fourth "thirty Sheikhs of the
648 Hanadi, the Awlad 'Ali, and the Beni'Una made their peace with the new power" (1935:30).

175 The version of history provided by my informants is
•186 no radical departure from these facts. But there are a few
124 differing aspects which represent ethnocentric highlights on
(648) history. For instance, the Bedouins of al-Qasr have a few stories which exaggerate the fact that the Harabi needed the cooperation of the Turkish rulers to defeat the Awlad 'Ali and to force them out of Cyrenaica. Also, the Bedouins point out, the Jumi'at tribe begged the Awlad 'Ali to come and rescue them from the oppression of the Hanadi.

175 Shortly after 1800, Muhammad 'Ali, the Ottoman
619 viceroy, droye the French from Egypt and supported the Hanadi
648 against the Awlad 'Ali. The Egytian ruler felt that political control over the Awlad 'Ali would insure the security of the whole desert, and especially Egypt's western frontier with Libya. Despite the alliance between the Hanadi and Muhammed 'Ali's forces, the outcome was a temporary victory for the Awlad 'Ali. This event actually set the stage for a transformation of Bedouin tribal society.

175 After the defeat of the Hanadi and the Pasha's troops,
648 the Awlad 'Ali were given preferential treatment by Muhammed 'Ali. He wisely secured the Hanadi tribe in Sharqiyya Province. Then he granted the Awlad 'Ali, by right of usufruct, the

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[423] makes the welfare aspects of "Arab Socialism" meaningful, but the Bedouins of al-Qasr feel that they are already practicing "Socialists."

The Bedouins feel that the programs of the government are insufficient: the desert is extra harsh and aid should compensate for this. On the other hand, the Egyptians who administer the aid programs claim that the Bedouins do not differentiate between "giving cooperation" and "receiving aid." [181] Agricultural advisers complain that the Bedouins are lazy. One agronomist whose job it was to teach the Bedouins how to cultivate the olive tree said that they did not want to learn: "They want us to plant the trees, water them and care for them, harvest the olives, and then they will take them to the market and sell them!" This statement is typical. The [186] Bedouins reply: "The Egyptians did not teach us how to grow the olive. Our fathers planted the olive here long before they came into the desert." The Bedouins feel that the Egyptians should follow their advice concerning the use and control of water in the desert; that if they did the olive [186] would flourish and life would be easier. "The Egyptians," they say, "are lazy and cannot keep up with our requests for more seedlings. They cannot furnish us with what we need to improve our lives. All we hear is: 'tomorrow, tomorrow'!"

[241] The Bedouins do not understand the methods of modern hydrology and agronomy. They see no reason for the experimenta-

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There is another objection which I have concerning our customs. I mean the case of elections. For instance, one from the 'Aishaibat and one from the Sanagra, of the 'Ali Abyad, are nominated. Then, each man must vote for the one from his own tribe. He must vote for the 'Aishaibi even if the other is the better man. But, we should consider that the best man is the man with the best qualifications. 'Umda Ibrahim, for instance, knows how to greet an official or a minister, but he does not know the 'awaiyid nor the problems of the Bedouins. His brother (who will probably be the next 'umda) is a good man and is educated, but he does not know the 'awaiyid either.

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This view contrasts sharply with the traditional stand of most Bedouins in al-Qasr, including the members of the "status group." For instance, one 'aqila voiced what is a prevalent opinion when he said:

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If a man chooses to become a political candidate against a Bedouin, he must understand that the members of the tribe should and would vote for their 'umda because he is a member of their own tribe. Even if a man is crazy and his opponent has the highest college degree, the Bedouins must vote for the man from their own tribe.

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Hajj 'Ali is modern in his evaluation of the political situation here: a politician should know the problems of his constituents rather than follow principles based on traditional relationships. His motive is not to promote the 'awaiyid as a good way of life, for we know he does not think this to be the case. Instead, Hajj 'Ali believes that in order to help the Bedouins through a period of change one must know what they are changing from. Through his negative appraisal of

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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strative posts and contain not more than a few hundred persons. Shahhat and Tubruq had been Turkish posts before the Italians made them administrative centres. Taukra and Talmaitha had been Sanusiya lodges. Suluq and Qaminis were Italian creations. Marsa Susa (Apollonia) was first occupied by Cretan refugees during the Turco-Greek war of 1897. Ajadabiya, the town of which the Arab historian al-Bakri of the eleventh century spoke in such glowing terms, had ceased to be a settled centre until the Turks made it an administrative post. During the period of truce between the Sanusi and the Italians from 1917 to 1922 it became the seat of the Sanusi Amir, Sayyid Mahammad Idris, and afterwards an Italian administrative and commercial centre.

It has been noted that almost all the townsmen of Cyrenaica are immigrants from the west, from Morocco to Tripolitania, and the Bedouin regard them as foreigners and often with some distaste, especially the Tripolitanian immigrants. It is true that there is a small element of Bedouin origin in the towns, for the more stable and poorer Bedouin living near towns sometimes drift into them; but when they do so their descendants soon lose their links with the tents and their tribal status. The road to town life is a way along which there is no return, for the townsmen are not only foreigners, but their food, their speech, their dress, their manners, their interests, their loyalties, and in general their way of life and their sentiments, are different. The Bedouin visit the towns from time to time, but they do not feel at home in them, and they do not look at home in them either. In a town one can spot a Bedouin at a glance by his appearance, his step, his dignity, his naivety, and his loud voice, which sometimes startles the shopkeeper with whom he disputes a price.

The road to the towns is not only a way along which there is no return, but is a one-way track. A Bedouin can become a citizen, but a citizen can never become a Bedouin. He cannot live the life of the tents. Hence the Bedouin say that while it is always bad for a Bedouin girl to marry a townsman, it is possible for her to adapt herself to urban life, but it is out of the question for a Bedouin to marry a townsman's daughter, for it is impossible for her to become a daughter of the tents.

The *bwadi*, Bedouin, and the *hadur*, citizens, are separate

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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CHAPTER III

THE SANUSIYA AND THE TRIBES

I

793 619 WHEN the Grand Sanusi came to preach in Cyrenaica he found the kind of society I have outlined: a congeries of tribes without law or effective government, for the Turks had little control over the interior, but with like values and habits and a community of life which crossed tribal boundaries. The Bedouin to [181] whom he preached were simple people living the austere and monotonous life of the tents, with that savage character which has been so often portrayed, but also with those noble qualities which have seldom failed to evoke admiration from those who [179] have lived among them. They were profoundly ignorant about [797] the outside world and also—which is what touched the heart of the Grand Sanusi—about the faith of their fathers, and to this matter I must now return, since the Sanusiya was a missionary Order and can only be understood as such.

771 [797] Though the Bedouin professed Islam before the Grand Sanusi influenced them by his teaching, they were almost totally ignorant of its doctrinal content, rites, or ritual and moral duties, and it is safe to assume that they did not obey its precepts. It is safe to assume this because even to-day, after a century of Sanusiya instruction, the Bedouin perform their religious duties in a very perfunctory way, if at all, and when Muslim law is at variance with tribal custom they follow tribal custom. In saying that they are lax, I do not suggest that they are not very sincere, Muslims. They are proud of being Muslims [186] and consider themselves greatly superior to Christians, while they are contemptuous of Jews. Nevertheless, though they would not belittle, the Cyrenaican Bedouin feel no embarrassment at neglecting, the duties obligatory on every Muslim. The Confession of Faith is known to all and implicitly accepted by all. It imposes no irksome restrictions or tiresome duties. But they almost completely neglect—I speak of the more [782] nomadic sections whom I know best, but it is probably true of most Cyrenaican Bedouin—their daily prayers, a duty which is

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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and political boundaries, help to keep the Islamic world together against the impact of western civilization and imperialism. A member of the Qadiriya or Rifa'iya Orders can wander from lodge to lodge from China to the Atlantic. A member of the Madaniya is received as a brother if he goes to Maknas, Istanbul, or Mecca. An 'Isawi or 'Arusi finds lodges of his Order all over North Africa, obeying the same rules, bearing the same banner, using the same books of devotion, performing the same ritual, and bound by a common brotherhood. These Orders, therefore, are not unimportant in shaping and propagating a common opinion and feeling among Muslims about any question of the day which affects Islam.

But in a narrower political sense they have little importance, even in the urban centres. They are too weak and poor to act as cells in a movement of a political kind, for they show, as René Brunel says of the 'Isawiya, 'lack of unity of direction' and 'absolute lack of cohesion'[1] In Cyrenaica the Sanusiya alone has been capable of becoming a political movement and hence of all the Orders alone aroused the suspicion of Istanbul and the hostility of Rome. We may inquire, therefore, what it is which has distinguished the Sanusiya from the other Orders in the country. As we have noted earlier, the fakiristic exhibitions of some of the Orders, so dear to the common man in the towns, were uncongenial, even repellent, to the Bedouin, who, in any case, had no affection for the townsmen and for things emanating from the towns. Also the Bedouin, socially and morally secure in their tribal and kinship systems, felt no need for further associations. Their need was for some authority lying outside their segmentary tribal system which could compose inter-tribal and intersectional disputes and bind the tribes and tribal sections together within an organization and under a common symbol. Hence, while the urban lodges were clubs—and this was the status of the Sanusiya lodges in the towns as much as it was that of the lodges of the other Orders—the Sanusiya lodges in the country-side were political, administrative, and economic, as well as religious and educational, centres. The urban lodges followed the social pattern in urban communities generally. Corporate life was narrowed to small quarters, single streets, a few houses, outside which people belonged, it is true, to a

[1] *Essai sur la Confrérie religieuse des 'Aîssâoua au Maroc*, 1926, p. 53.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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account of the Italian invasion of Tripolitania. Realizing that they were helpless without Sanusiya support not only in the Sahara but also in Libya, since they would not be able without command of the sea to reinforce their garrisons there, the Turks showed themselves anxious to win over Sayyid Ahmad al-Sharif by also conferring on him new privileges. In 1910 the Governor of Banghazi proposed to make him a monthly grant of 4,000 Piastres, and the Governor of Tripoli sent a telegram in cipher to his representatives in various parts of Tripolitania asking them whether they thought the Sanusiya Order powerful enough to warrant additional privileges, which was apparently the view of Istanbul. His representatives, judging by its lesser influence in Tripolitania, where it never gained the unanimous support it received in Cyrenaica, reported that in their opinion the political importance of the Order had been exaggerated.[1]

Such of these events as were known to Italian observers shortly before and in the early stages of their war with Turkey led them to false conclusions because the complexity of Arab sentiments was not appreciated. The structure of Bedouin society is such that whatever the size of the group a man considers himself to belong to in any situation, he is in virtue of his loyalty to it opposed to other groups of like order in the tribal structure. He is loyal to his *bait* against other *biyut*, to his *'aila* against other *'ailat*, and to his *qabila* against other *qabail*. Nevertheless, he has a strong feeling of communion with all the Bedouin of his country, regardless of their tribal affiliations, in common opposition to the towns. But Bedouin and citizen are both Arab and they made common cause against the Turks, especially when the activities of the 'Young Turks' forced Turk and Arab into rival camps. But even Arab and Turk shared wider loyalties in their regard—unequal, it is true, but still shared—for the Sultanate and for Islam and they reacted in spontaneous accord against threats from Christian Powers, the French advance in the Sahara and the Italian invasion of Libya. Against Christians and Europeans Arabs and Turks were no longer Arabs and Turks but Muslims, just as against the Turks Bedouin and citizens were no longer Bedouin and citizens but Arabs, and against the towns tribesmen were no longer members of different tribes but a Bedouin community.

[1] Macaluso, op. cit., pp. 88–90, and Serra, op. cit., p. 37.

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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*175 *648 *795 Turkish Government had been eliminated militarily and politically from Cyrenaica. In its place was the Order, recognized by all as the one body which could speak for the Bedouin of the country, on whose behalf it treated with the Italian Government in the years between the two wars. Thus the first war had begun as a war against Turkey and became slowly transformed into a war against the Sanusiya. The second war was against the Sanusiya.

*175 *648 *795 At first sight the Italians might seem to have been in 1923 in a more advantageous position than in 1911 to 1917, for they were united at home, at peace with the world, had established bases in Cyrenaica, and were opposed only by untrained Bedouin tribesmen instead of by Turkish soldiers who, however few and badly equipped, had nevertheless been disciplined, experienced in modern warfare, and under regular officers of distinction. But these advantages were offset by the loss of prestige the Italians had suffered in the eyes of the Bedouin since 1911. Both in Cyrenaica and in Tripolitania the Italians, if they had not been defeated, had certainly not been victorious. The Bedouin had seen them in both provinces of Libya advance in heavy columns across the country, occupy all the important centres, and then retreat in panic to the coast; and they had judged by the measure of their experience that the Italian is not a soldier. Then, in both countries, they had seen successive Italian Governors giving way to threats and trying to attain by diplomacy and bribery the ends brave men pursue by arms. Moreover, the Bedouin were far better equipped than they had been in 1911, for they had replaced their old weapons with modern rifles captured from the Italians. Col. Talbot reported in 1916 that they looked on every Italian troop movement as a gift from God. Hence energy and initiative which might have broken Bedouin morale had they been applied after the Sanusi defeat by the British in 1915–16, when expended in the opening stages of the second war did not effect the speedy crumbling of resistance hoped for. Indeed what happened in the first war was repeated in the second.

*175 *648 *795 The Italians had in 1923 the same overwhelming superiority in men and equipment they enjoyed in 1911, perhaps an even greater superiority in that they could use the knowledge acquired in the European war, particularly in the use of

3:Evans-Pritchard E-4, 5 (1942-1944) 1949 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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followed it. In 1923, when he was called to take the foremost part in the struggle, he was already over sixty years of age. He was a simple man, religious, courageous, contemptuous of worldly honours and success, and with singular tenacity and powers of physical endurance. It may well be true that, as is reported, Sayyid al-Mahdi said 'If we had ten men like 'Umar we would not need any more'.

IV

All the *adwar*, or guerrilla bands, on the plateau came under Sidi 'Umar's command and he signed himself *al-Naib al-'Amm*, the Representative-General (of the Sanusiya). Each Bedouin tribe, as in Enver's day, maintained its own guerrilla band, some 100 to 300 men strong. Towards the end of the war the guerrillas never numbered, all told, more than 600 to 700. Only a certain number of men could maintain themselves on the country and move through it with speed and secrecy. As in other guerrilla wars, the actual fighting was done by small bands of enthusiasts, whose success nevertheless depended on the goodwill of the whole population. The bands suffered very heavy casualties, but were maintained at strength by a constant stream of adventurous spirits from submitted and unsubmitted sections alike. Though each band was named after a tribe and its members were chiefly recruited from that tribe and fought in its territory, they were not entirely recruited from it and they might fight anywhere. In each tribal band there were a good number of volunteers from other tribes and a sprinkling of *Ikhwan*, Sudanese, and Tripolitanians. The 'Awaqir and Magharba had separate bands while the other tribal bands usually fought in pairs, Hasa–'Abaidat, Bara'asa–Darsa, and 'Abid–'Arafa. A Misuratan contingent formed a small band of its own which greatly distinguished itself in the fighting. Each band had a simple organization: a commander, a *qaimaqam* for civil affairs, a qadi for religious and legal purposes, a commissariat agent, and a number of officers, some of whom had been trained in Turkish regular units. Sidi 'Umar maintained discipline in the bands, and acts of pillage or personal vendetta were severely punished. Those of the guerrillas who possessed horses rode them. The rest went on foot. Each band had its Sanusi flag.

Second, the fiction that nothing has happened, which characterises the father's behavior, does not cease with the termination of the celebrations. Each morning, soon after daybreak and before the camp is astir, the groom must leave his bride and repair to his father's tent to lie at his father's side "as he always had done in the past, as if he had not left him." This conventional ruse is followed, not just for the seven days of wedding festivities, but is continued after the groom has moved back into the camp proper, and pitched his tent alongside his father's, with the ropes of the two tents crossing.

In matters other than sleeping arrangements, this fiction that "nothing has happened" is maintained. Marriage does not mean the immediate creation of a wholly separate domestic unit. Save for the appearance of an additional tent, the ordinary run of daytime activities is scarcely altered. To mention perhaps the most important feature of the relationships between father and son, the groom continues to eat with his father. [redacted] the son does not use his own bowl,[1] and may not, indeed, do so for several years. The important symbolism of "eating together" or "eating out of the one bowl," the act of commensality creating a bond of fellowship about which Robertson Smith[2] wrote so eloquently can only be referred to here in one of its many aspects. Bedouin themselves stress that eating together is a strong bond, and the communal meal is always used for this purpose after the settlement of a dispute, or at the conclusion of a blood-money agreement, and so on. It is significant also in the sense that those who partake of a meal accept the authority of the host; he becomes their protector, and a blow against one of them is struck at him also. Even if the guest is an enemy,[3] as long as he has eaten from another's bowl his life is safe.

The slaughter of an animal for another person creates a bond which has its roots in the intimate connection between man and his animals. In a very vivid way, the Bedouin view their animals as part of themselves, as part of their *Risiq*, their general wealth, in which their sons are included. It is this mystical association between a man and his animals which distinguishes a meal consisting of the meat of an animal slaughtered from ones' own flock or herd from a meal consisting of meat bought from a butcher's shop — often given by the plateau peoples of Northern Cyrenaica to their guests, but which the camel-herding Bedouin of the south regard as despicable hospitality. A slaughtered animal is the food, *par excellence*, which establishes this bond

[1] When Bedouin take their meals, they eat from large wooden bowls imported from south of the Sahara. It is a matter of custom that a man does not eat alone unless it is unavoidable, a custom of such strength, that, when, one day, only an elder, occupying a tent the ropes of which were crossed with mine, was left in camp, he brought his bowl into my tent "so that I will be eating with a man."

[2] William Robertson Smith. *The Religion of the Semites*. 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 1927.

[3] A stranger entering a camp is under no obligation to give his identity. Few do so until they have partaken of a meal. In the past, the Bedouin claim, the period of anonymity could last for 40 days, but nowadays, they say they limit it to two only. I have known strangers enter a camp, receive entertainment, and leave without offering any specific identity.

9: Murray E, K-3, 4 (ca. 1910-1935) 1935 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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first successes in Senegal, the Beni Hilal and the Beni Suleim were being despatched by the Caliph Mustansir billah against Mu'izz ibn Badis, his rebellious viceroy in Tripoli. They sang of their conquest :

> " Great was the king, son of Badis, a mighty man of war !
> Yet we routed his thirty thousand men !
> We were but three thousand, yet the victory was ours, and ours the spoil !
> Their hearts were as water, not a man was in their ranks !
> We routed them and they fled far and wide ! "

These Beni Hilal, now extinct, are famous wherever Arabic is spoken for the exploits of their legendary hero Abu Zeid, while the Beni Suleim had helped the Prophet at the battle of Hunein, and are said by Hogarth to be the ancestors of the great modern tribe of Harb.[1]

The confusion of these two invasions caused the races of North Africa to become inextricably mixed. Both Arabs and Berbers spent their lives in the desert herding their flocks, and both were warlike. So it is natural that the intermarriages of a few generations should have made one people of them, and it is also natural that the conquered should claim relationship with the conquerors and not vice versa. But this aspiration of the Berbers has flooded their genealogies with so many lies that it is difficult to disentangle the truth.

The descendants of the original colonists, much mixed with Berber blood, still preserve their title of Murabitin, though no longer living in *ribat*, which soon lost their military character and were turned into *Zawia* " monasteries ", where the more peacefully inclined of the sect retired for religious teaching and contemplation. Later, when the *ribat* came to be deserted, the peaceful Murabitin, ill-fitted by their monastic habits for the resumption of an active nomadic life, sank into dependence on their warlike brethren the Sa'adi, and, among a primitive race, dependence means inferiority. Thus in Arabia any tribe that pays tribute to another is despised as Hiteim. And so the once proud title of " Murabitin " has simply come to mean " vassal " and nothing more.

[1] *History of Arabia*, 38.

9: Murray E, K-3, 4 (ca. 1910-1935) 1935 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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maintained to this day in the desert between the last two and the Sa'adi, though they are relaxed in the cultivation.

The Jumei'at, who used to be "Murabitin" to the Beni 'Una, are now nominally so to the Awlad 'Ali, but are not required to pay tribute. Other tribes, such as the Jawabis and 'Awarma, are in an intermediate stage between the Sa'adi and the Murabitin. The Awlad 'Abd es-Sallam, the Samalus ed-Diminat, and perhaps the Fawakhir, call themselves "Murabitin bil Baraka", a priestly caste which, in Tripoli, used to receive special privileges from the Turkish Government.

Though the Sa'adi tribes despise the Murabitin as serfs, they respect them for their piety and resort to them for the writing of charms.

While the Murabitin tribes generally may be suspected to contain more Libyan blood than the Sa'adi, there are other tribes such as the 'Amayim, the Jahama, and the Tarhuna, who have come to Egypt from further west than any of the above, and who seem to be quite definitely "Berber", though, of course, none of them will admit it. These are known euphemistically as 'Arab el-Gharb.

Even some of the Juheina, settled east of the Nile in Sharqiya, are scorned by Klippel as "d'origine berbère, se pretendant section d'une tribu d'Arabie".[1]

Awlad 'Ali.—This tribe, by far the most important of the Western Bedouin, occupies with its vassals the whole north coast of Egypt from Salum to Alexandria. Like the others, they claim descent from the Beni Suleim, alleging their ancestor 'Ali, son of 'Aqar, to be a grandson of that Dib, or Abu Dib, mentioned by Ibn Khaldun. Their enemies, however, allege that he was a Jew. "When the Arabs occupied the north coast of Africa, there was a notable, a Jew, who owned property at Saqiet el-Hamra in Morocco. This man welcomed and entertained the Arab sheikh Ez-Zanati. He became very popular with the sheikh, who gave him his daughter named Sa'ada, on condition that he embraced Islam before the marriage contract was made out."[2] Another version calls the Jew Yana, and says that he had two daughters. Of these Sa'ada was the

[1] E. Klippel, "Etudes sur le folklore Bédouin de l'Egypte," *Bull. Soc. Khédiv. de Géogr.*, vii. 10, Cairo, 1911.

[2] From information collected by Muhammad Bey Wasfi.

9: Murray E, K-3, 4 (ca. 1910-1935) 1935 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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619 oppression, he gathered his people and delivered a fiery
175 denunciation of his religion, during which he smashed his
726 rosary into pieces and mixed it with his horse's fodder;
792 Baqush then invited their kinsmen (?) the Awlad 'Ali, to come over from the "Green Mountain" and help them. To entice the Awlad 'Ali, he is said to have sent them samples of salt desert water and Nile water sweetened with sugar to illustrate the difference between the hardships of the desert and the comforts of the Rif.[1]

619 As recounted earlier, the Awlad 'Ali completely routed the
175 Hanadi and their allies, and drove them from the desert.
726 In the division of the conquered territory, the Jumei'at received a third, and, although they were still considered Murabitin, were released from the payment of tribute. They
[131] now live intermingled with the free sections of the Awlad 'Ali, all along the north coast of Egypt, and are numerous in Beheira, especially near Abu Hummus.

619 *Samalus.*—The Samalus are found scattered among the
[131] Awlad 'Ali on the northern coast and stranded among many of the Egyptian provinces. They once possessed a head sheikh Abu Sala at Minya, and colonies are recorded from Faiyum, Beheira, Menufiya, Gharbiya, and Sharqiya. An
[175] old paper from the Recruiting Department gives from
[162] seventeen villages in the Faiyum 775 mounted Samalus
[231] and 1,400 on foot, possessing 1,760 camels and 11,400
[312] sheep. Two important groups of wells, both called "Sawani es-Samalus" exist on the north coast, one about 50 kilometres east of Salum, and the other 20 kilometres south of Dhab'a.

[173] They say they came to Egypt, 400 strong, about 200 years ago, from the Wadi Samalus in the Jebel Akhdar, and their ancestor twelve generations ago was Nasr el-Hasani, of course an "Arab from Beni Suleim".

[175] In the *Description de l'Egypte*, P. D. Martin relates how
[726] in 1800 the Samalus of Faiyum were raided by a party of Ferjan, 200 strong, from Beheira.

619 *Shiheibat.*—These are a "Mrabit" tribe from the west with
• 186 an unenviable reputation, living near the Wadi Natrun. Sayed Idris, the former Senussi leader, says of them: "Most

[1] Dumreicher, 16. This is probably the "Sheik Abdall Gawyal Bagooshi" who wrote to Sir Sydney Smith in March, 1801, warning him of the approach of the French from Damanhur. Wilson, *History of the British Expedition in Egypt*, 371. (Rif = cultivated area.)

9: Murray E, K-3, 4 (ca. 1910-1935) 1935 MT9 Libyan Bedouin MT9
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herds have a black goat or two—such are the Shiheibat." They are families of shepherds scattered amongst the Sa'adi families, and must not be confused with the 'Esheibat section of the Awlad 'Ali.

Dumreicher (pp. 52–7) gives a lively account of a quarrel between the Jawabis and the Shiheibat.